As of November 2025 draws to a close, Malaysia’s political landscape remains dominated by one phrase: the “Green Wave.” Coined after the 2022 general election (GE15), when Parti Islam Se-Malaysia (PAS) – whose party colour is green – surged to become the single largest party in Parliament with 43 seats (later increased to 49 through defections and by-elections), the term describes the rapid rise of conservative Islamic politics in a country long praised (and criticised) for its multi-ethnic, multi-religious balancing act.

Three years on, the wave has not receded. PAS now governs four states – Kelantan, Terengganu, Kedah, and Perlis – with near-total control in the first three, and it leads the federal opposition coalition Perikatan Nasional (PN). Yet the question that still divides analysts, voters, and the commentariat is simple: does the Green Wave represent a genuine, irreversible turn toward political Islam in Malaysia, or is it mostly a protest vote wrapped in religious clothing?

From Rural Stronghold to National Player

PAS is Malaysia’s oldest Islamist party, founded in 1951 by religious scholars who broke away from UMNO over what they saw as the latter’s secular nationalism. For decades it was confined to the rural Malay heartlands of the northeast, winning Kelantan repeatedly but struggling elsewhere. Its core demand has always been the same: Malaysia should be governed according to Islamic principles, with hudud (Islamic criminal punishments) eventually applied to Muslims.

Everything changed in 2022–2023. Disillusionment with UMNO’s corruption scandals (especially 1MDB), anger at Bersatu’s “betrayal” in the 2020 Sheraton Move, and frustration with Pakatan Harapan’s unfulfilled reform promises pushed Malay voters toward PN. PAS offered what many saw as the cleanest, most principled alternative. The result was a landslide in Malay-majority seats: PAS won every parliamentary seat in Kelantan, Terengganu, and Perlis, and all but one in Kedah.

Studies later showed that young Malay voters – the TikTok and tahfiz-school generation – were crucial. Some analysts called it rising religiosity; others called it an anti-establishment protest. A 2025 Iman Research study concluded it was mostly the latter: Malay youth punished poor governance more than they demanded a caliphate.

Governing in the States: Conservatism in Action

In the four states PAS controls, the party has moved quickly to show what Islamic governance looks like:

• Gender segregation at public events and cinemas
• Dress-code enforcement for non-Muslims in certain government premises
• Bans on gambling outlets and alcohol sales
• In Terengganu, a new rule (announced August 2025) that Muslim men who miss Friday prayers without excuse can face fines or up to two years in jail
• Periodic calls – the latest in November 2025 – for hudud to address “moral decay” such as out-of-wedlock pregnancies

These measures affect Muslims almost exclusively, because the Malaysian Constitution limits syariah courts to family and personal-law matters for Muslims only Muslims. Hudud laws passed in Kelantan (1993) and Terengganu (2003) remain unenforceable without federal parliamentary amendments that will never pass in a multi-ethnic legislature.

Still, the symbolism matters. Non-Malays and urban liberals see creeping “Talibanisation”; rural Malay voters often see moral discipline they believe the federal government lacks.

The National Pitch: Moderation or Taqiyya?

Aware that it can never form a federal government on Malay votes alone, PAS has spent 2024–2025 trying to soften its image. At its September 2025 muktamar, president Abdul Hadi Awang declared the party “ready to lead the nation” and promised to respect non-Muslim sensitivities. PAS leaders floated ideas such as teaching Mandarin and Tamil in national schools and fielding non-Muslim candidates (via a supporters’ wing).

The PAS Youth wing even staged motorbike convoys and “cool” social-media campaigns to win over Gen Z and Alpha voters. Critics called it superficial rebranding: the same muktamar still heard speeches insisting that “only Islam can unite a plural society” and that non-Muslims must accept Malay-Islamic primacy.

The Plural Society Test

Malaysia’s social contract has always been uneasy: Islam is the religion of the Federation, Malays enjoy special privileges, but citizenship rights for non-Malays were guaranteed in exchange for those privileges. The Green Wave puts that bargain under strain.

Non-Malays (roughly 32 per cent of the population) overwhelmingly reject PAS. In the 2023 state elections, PN won only 3 of 147 non-Malay majority seats. Chinese and Indian voters remain loyal to DAP and whatever remains of the Barisan Nasional component parties. East Malaysia, with its large indigenous Christian populations, is even more sceptical; PN holds few seats in Sabah and Sarawak.

Within Peninsular Malaysia’s mixed-urban seats, PAS still struggles.

Yet the bigger long-term worry is among moderate Malays themselves. Surveys in 2025 show growing conservative sentiment – more young Malays want religion to play a larger role in politics – but also persistent attachment to Malaysia’s plural framework. PAS’s challenge is that the moment it looks serious about federal power, its rhetoric must moderate, which risks alienating its base; the moment it doubles down on Islamist purity it scares away the votes it needs to govern nationally.

Where Does the Wave Go Next?

As GE16 (due by early 2028) approaches, three scenarios dominate discussion:

1. The wave crests and breaks if Anwar Ibrahim’s “Madani” government delivers tangible economic wins and UMNO rebuilds credibility in the Malay belt.
2. It keeps growing but stays geographically limited to the north and east, forcing perpetual hung parliaments and unstable coalitions.
3. PAS succeeds in its urban, youth, and non-Malay outreach and becomes a genuine national governing party – an outcome that would force Malaysia to redefine the role of religion in public life more explicitly than at any time since independence.

For now the Green Wave is neither an unstoppable tsunami nor a passing storm. It is a powerful current running through one half of Malaysian society while the other half watches warily from the shore. How the country navigates it will determine whether Malaysia remains Southeast Asia’s most successful plural society – or becomes its most instructive cautionary tale.

Related articles:

1. Unity Government vs Opposition: Who Will Win GE16?
2. But Malaysia Could Become More Conservative If Moderates Stay Silent
3. Is Malaysia Becoming More Conservative — Or Just Louder?
4.Malaysia’s Racial Politics: Are We Stuck Forever, or Slowly Moving Forward?
5. Malaysia Politics Today: A Country That Wants Stability, but Keeps Getting Drama
6. The Legacy of Mahathir’s Policies: The Cost of National Unity
7. The Dangers of PAS’s Religious Political Agenda: Malaysia at a Crossroads
8. The Grave Dangers of Merging Politics and Religion: A Fatal Threat to Pluralistic Societies
9. Those who always use race and religion issues to seek political gains are morally corrupt leaders
10. A New Political Future for MCA, MIC, and Gerakan: Dissolution, Rebirth, and the Dangers of Any Alignment with PAS
11. Putting National Interest First: Reject Extremism and Rebuild Malaysia’s Future
12. The Corrosive Cost of Racial Politics: How Race-Based Governance Destroys Nations from Within